Three Recent Works on Contractual Interpretation [Part 2] by McCamus, John D.
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
Osgoode Digital Commons
Articles & Book Chapters Faculty Scholarship
2012
Three Recent Works on Contractual Interpretation
[Part 2]
John D. McCamus
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, jmccamus@osgoode.yorku.ca
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works
Part of the Contracts Commons
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
This Review Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Recommended Citation
McCamus, John D. "Three Recent Works on Contractual Interpretation [Part 2]." Canadian Business Law Journal 52.2 (2012):
300-321.
REVIEW ESSAYS AND BOOK REVIEWS
Three Recent Works on Contractual Interpretation: Steven J.
Burton, Elements of Contractual Interpretation; Geoff R. Hall,
Canadian Contractual Interpretation Law; Catherine Mitchell,
Interpretation of Contracts: Part One
1. Introduction
From a practical perspective, the law of contractual
interpretation is an extremely important aspect of the law of
contracts. For the commercial lawyer, issues of contractual
interpretation constitute a mainstay of one's daily practice. It is
therefore surprising that the field is quite underwritten. There are
few scholarly monographs and a modest volume of secondary
literature on the subject. It is not obvious why this should be the
case. Statutory interpretation has attracted a comparatively vast
literature.' One possible explanation is that the doctrine is so
complex and indeed, inconsistent, that it does not yield easily to
the author's pen. Further, the subject may appear a bit too dry for
academic taste though, it must be said, it is not palpably less
exciting than the academically more well-trodden topics of
contract law. Although the major treatises on contract law do
provide some coverage of the subject and in England, the
profession has access to the splendid text by Lewison L.J.,2 little
else has been available. Accordingly, it is an unexpected pleasure to
welcome the arrival of three new works on the subject. For
Canadian lawyers, the publication of Geoff Hall's text, Canadian
Contractual Interpretation Law, 3 will be especially welcome. The
other volumes, one by an American academic, Steven Burton,4 and
the other by an English academic, Catherine Mitchell,' also offer
valuable contributions to our understanding of the subject. Part
One of this review article consists of a discussion of Burton's
I. For a recent and innovative attempt to provide a comprehensive theory of
interpretation covering the interpretation of statutes, contracts, wills and
constitutions by former Chief Justice Barak, see A. Barak, Purposive Interpreta-
tion in Law, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2005).
2. K. Lewison, Interpretation of Contracts. 4th ed. (London, Sweet & Maxwell,
2007).
3. G.R. Hall, Canadian Contractual Interpretation Law (Markham, LexisNexis
Canada, 2007).
4. S.J. Burton, Elements of Contract Interpretation (New York, Oxford University
Press, 2009).
5. C. Mitchell, Interpretation of Contracts (London, Routledge-Cavendish, 2007).
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monograph. Part Two, which will be published in the next issue of
the C.B.L.J., will turn to the works by Hall and Mitchell.
2. Steven J. Burton, Elements of Contractual Interpretation
The principal achievement of this new work by Professor Burton
is the articulation of a lucid analytical model within which to
assemble and assess various approaches to issues of contractual
interpretation. As in other fields, American experience and
jurisprudence is both vast and richly varied. Writing in the
American context, therefore, Burton is able to examine a broad
range of possible solutions to problems of contractual
interpretation. Burton does not, however, simply survey the
possibilities; he is a man with a mission. He is staunchly opposed
to what he sees as the emerging consensus in the American law of
contractual interpretation. He argues strenuously and, no doubt
for some, convincingly for a return to a more conservative era and
approach to the issues.
Burton's relatively short monograph is tightly structured and
closely argued. He begins at the beginning, one might say, and
identifies the goals of contractual interpretation. As Burton
observes, "American courts universally say that the primary goal
of contract interpretation is to ascertain the parties' intention at
the time they made their contract."6 In pursuing this objective, the
courts are aligned with the four principal goals of contract law.
The first objective is to give effect to the "contractual freedoms,"
these being freedom "of" contract, i.e., the freedom to create
contractual relationships that give effect to the parties' desires and
intentions with respect to the future and freedom "from" contract
in the sense that obligations will not be imposed on parties without
their consent. There are, in his view, three other important goals.
First, Burton emphasizes the importance of "the security of
transactions." Here, he is particularly concerned with the ability of
third parties, such as assignees, to rely on their reasonable
expectations as to the meaning of contractual documents. A
third goal pertains to the "peaceful settlement of disputes non-
arbitrarily, in accordance with the Rule of Law" 7 and weighs in
favour of consistency and predictability in the law. A fourth
related goal is that of "formulating legal rules that are
6. Burton, supra, footnote 4, at p. 1.
7. Ibid., at p. 7.
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administrable by the courts and by the parties."' This goal weighs
in favour of rules that "draw relatively clear lines and require
objective proof."' Briefly stated, Burton's concern with the
modern consensus in American interpretation doctrine is that it
privileges the contractual freedoms at the expense of the other
three goals.
Burton then identifies the three "tasks" that must be undertaken
as the law of contractual interpretation pursues these objectives.
First, one must identify the terms that require interpretation. The
principal source of controversy in performing this task is to
determine whether, when interpreting a written agreement, there
are collateral oral or written agreements that should be included as
part of the agreement to be interpreted. This is the domain of the
parol evidence rule and, as Burton emphasizes, this is its only role.
I would add that, strictly speaking, the parol evidence rule is not
really a component of the law of interpretation. The parol evidence
rule determines the contents of a contract in circumstances where
one party wishes to incorporate an alleged parol agreement into a
written contract. In such a case, there may be no difficulty in
interpreting the clear language of either the written document or
the alleged parol agreement. The problem is whether or not to
incorporate the latter into the former. Nonetheless, Burton is
surely correct in suggesting that the first step along the path to
proper interpretation of an agreement is to identify the contents of
the agreement.
The second task is for the court to determine whether the term
to be interpreted is ambiguous in the contested respect. A court
does not determine whether or not a term is ambiguous in the
abstract. The parties to the litigation will offer competing
interpretations of the term. The court must then determine
whether the term is ambiguous in the sense that it can plausibly
be interpreted in accord with both of the two contested meanings.
If the term in question may only reasonably bear one of the
contending interpretations advanced by the parties, the term is not
ambiguous in the contested respect and its "plain meaning" ought
to be enforced. This is for Burton the proper understanding of the
"plain meaning rule." Although, as he observes,'o the plain
meaning rule is shunned by many critics, properly understood, in
Burton's view, the rule is a simple tautology. That, indeed, explains
8. Ibid., at p. 8.
9. Ibid., at p. 8.
10. Ibid., at. p. xii.
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its persistence. If a court determines that the provision can
reasonably bear only one of the contested meanings, its plain
meaning should be enforced. On Burton's view, the plain meaning
rule has nothing to say with respect to the question of what
evidence, either intrinsic or extrinsic to the written document, can
be considered in arriving at the conclusion that the term is or is not
ambiguous in the requisite sense. Once ambiguity is found, the
third task arises. The court must, if possible, resolve the ambiguity.
Again, the critical question is to determine what evidence is
admissible and material to the task.
Having identified the three interpretive tasks, Burton then
further explores the critical question in the context of each task,
the determination of the resources that the court may examine in
performing the particular task. The most contentious issue is to
determine the extent to which a court may examine facts or
resources that are extrinsic to the contractual document itself. In
aid of providing an orderly analysis of the possible answers to this
critical question, Burton identifies three "theories" of
interpretation. For Burton, a theory of interpretation "tells an
interpreter how to perform the three tasks to further the goals of
contractual interpretation."" The three theories are literalism,
objectivism and subjectivism. The three theories differ on the facts
or resources - the "elements" of the book's title - that may be
taken into account by a court in performing each of the three tasks.
For purposes of analysis, it is not necessary that any or many
people in the real world are actually strict or consistent adherents
of any of the three theories. Indeed, it may be that Burton's
literalists and subjectivists (at least his "strong" subjectivists) are,
to some degree, caricatures. Nonetheless, these three theories do
serve well the author's objective of outlining various possible views
as to the elements that ought to be taken into account in
performing each of the three interpretive tasks.
"Literalism allows an interpreter to take into account only the
words of contracts and the dictionary." The literalist maintains
that words can have an objective or one true meaning apart from
the context in which they are used.12 Literalism is not to be taken
seriously. The idea that one can interpret an agreement with the
agreement in one hand and a dictionary in the other defies
common sense. Literalism is not followed by the American
I1. Ibid., at p. 2.
12. Ibid., at p. 21.
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courts, 13 though Burton asserts that commercial arbitrators often
adopt a literalist approach. He also accuses some law and
economic scholars of essentially adopting such a view. 14 Burton
quotes Learned Hand for the proposition that "[tihere is no surer
way to misread any document than to read it literally.""s In
Burton's view, some context is simply indispensable in determining
the meaning of language. Literalists themselves, he claims, cannot
avoid considering the context in which the disputed term is used in
order to choose from amongst dictionary definitions of the term. A
literalist must surely consider the context of the sentence or phrase
in which the word appears and the rules of grammar. More than
this, "[iut seems probable that an interpreter, supposing herself to
be a literalist, implicitly and perhaps unconsciously but inevitably,
uses more context than just a sentence or phrase."' 6 Thus, a
significant deficiency in the literalist approach is that the literalist
fails to openly identify the contractual elements actually employed
in interpreting the term in question.
The objectivist would consider a significantly broader range of
interpretive elements in performing the three tasks. In addition to
the disputed term, the dictionary and the rules of grammar, an
objectivist would examine "the contract as a whole, the objective
circumstances at formation, the document's purpose(s), ordinary
meanings, trade usages and customs, legal precedents and any
practical construction." 17 Readers familiar with the Anglo-
Canadian law of contractual interpretation will have little
difficulty in understanding the general nature of the various
items on that list. The "objective circumstances at formation"
roughly approximate what is referred to in English and Canadian
law as the "factual matrix" or commercial setting of the agreement.
The term "practical construction" refers to a course of
performance of the agreement in which one party knowingly and
willingly engages in repeated conduct over a considerable period of
time which the other party accepts or acquiesces in as acceptable
performance of the agreement.'" Arguably, such conduct is an
objective manifestation of how the parties themselves interpret the
contractual language concerning the obligation in question.
13. Ibid., at p. 18.
14. Ibid., at. pp. 36-37, attributing such views to Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott.
15. Ibid., at p. 19, citing Guiseppi v. Waling, 324 U.S. 244. 65 S.Ct. 605 (1944), at p.
624.
16. Burton, supra, footnote 4, at p. 39.
17. Ibid., at p. 41.
18. Ibid., at p. 50.
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The elements considered by a subjectivist in performing the
three tasks include the foregoing list and add three subjectivist
elements, i.e., a "prior course of dealing," the "course of
negotiations" and a party's testimony as to its intentions. These
elements are subjectivist, for Burton, in the sense that they "take
into account circumstances bearing only upon the parties'
subjective intentions."" The distinction between objectivist and
subjectivist elements is not watertight. In particular, the
distinction between "practical construction" as objectivist and
prior course of dealing as subjectivist is difficult to sustain.
Burton explains that practical construction "is objective because
it is based on conduct . . . that indicates how the parties used
ambiguous language on the point in question."2 o One might say,
however, that it is evidence of what the parties subjectively
understood to be the meaning of the ambiguous language.
Further, prior course of dealing is objective in the sense that it is
based on observable conduct and similarly, it too might be
considered to be a basis upon which to infer what the parties
understood subjectively with respect to the matter in question
when they negotiated their most recent contract. Thus, Burton's
sharp break between prior course of conduct as subjectivist and
practical construction as objectivist is difficult to defend.
Nonetheless, the distinction between objectivist and subjectivist
elements is workable in a general way. The objectivist rejects
evidence of prior course of dealing, the course of negotiations or
a party's evidence as to its own past intentions. The subjectivist
would consider such evidence to be material and admissible.
Burton briefly mentions the traditional canons of interpretation.
They are not "elements" in the sense in which he uses the term.
They are, in his view, rather "guides to interpretation,"2 ' many of
which come into play when the interpreter examines the document
as a whole. The presumptions in favour of a harmonious whole,
against mere surplusage, in favour of specific terms over more
general provisions in the event of conflict and the other familiar
Latin phrases will enable the interpreter to make sense of the
interaction of various components of the whole agreement. Other
canons, such as the preference in favour of legality, reflect
principles of public policy to be applied in the event of
ambiguity. The canons are not of particular relevance to
19. Ibid., at p. 56.
20. Ibid., at p. 51.
21. Ibid., at p. 59.
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Burton's thesis which is preoccupied with determining when and
whether the various "elements" he identifies should be considered
admissible and material in the performance of the three tasks.
Burton's account of the four goals of interpretation, the three
interpretive tasks the interpreter, the three theories and the lengthy
list of elements sets the table for the main analytical work of the
book. In chapters 3 to 5 Burton provides a sustained analysis of
each of the three tasks. In each case, he describes how each of the
three theories would approach the task and, more particularly,
which of the elements would be considered relevant to their
performance. Arguments for and against the various positions are
often advanced.
Chapter 3, "Identifying the Terms," is preoccupied with analysis
of the parol evidence rule. Identification of the terms of the
contract becomes problematic in circumstances where there exists a
written agreement and one party alleges that their agreement also
includes certain collateral understandings. This is the problem and,
again, the only problem that the parol evidence rule is designed to
solve. Burton provides a detailed analysis of the rule and its
various exceptions. He states the rule thusly:
When an enforceable, written agreement is the final and the complete
expression of the parties' agreement, prior oral and written agreements and
contemporaneous oral agreements (together "parol agreements") concerning
the same subject as the writing do not establish contract terms when the parol
agreement contradicts or adds to the terms of the writing. 2 2
The principal purpose of the rule is the implementation of "the
parties' intention by giving the writing the effect they intended it to
have."2 3 The critical question then becomes, what evidence is
considered relevant and material to the determination of whether
the parties had such an intention.
A literalist would take the view that the parties' intent on this
point is best reflected in the document itself. On this view, the
presence or absence of a merger clause is critical. Some courts take
the view that a clear merger clause raises a conclusive presumption
of integration. In theory, neither the context nor the document as a
whole is relevant to the enquiry. Burton asserts, however, that
literalism on this point can lead to error. The parties with prior
22. Ibid., at p. 64. Burton further notes that a second part of the rule provides for the
situation in which the integration of the written agreement is merely partial. In
such circumstances, the parol agreement may add to but not contradict the
"partially integrated agreement." Ibid., at pp. 64-65.
23. Ibid., at p. 69.
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binding agreements may not intend to supersede them
notwithstanding the presence of such a clause. Moreover, such
clauses may be ambiguous. Literalism offers no solution to this
problem.
Some American courts follow an objectivist approach and
attempt to determine the existence of an intention to integrate on
the basis of the whole written contract as interpreted by a
reasonable person, together with any allegation of an alleged parol
agreement. Such courts rarely consider factors such as relative
bargaining strength or the presence of counsel. They attempt to
determine whether the written agreement would "naturally" 24 have
included the alleged collateral agreement if the parties considered it
binding. A merger clause would raise a rebuttable presumption of
integration. Burton reports, however, that most American courts
follow a subjectivist approach and will examine all elements
relevant to determining the presence of an intention to integrate
including evidence of negotiations, party statements as to their
intent and any other material evidence. A merger clause would be
merely some evidence of the existence of such an intention. As we
will see, Burton does not agree with the majority American rule.
In chapter 4, "The Ambiguity Question," Burton turns to the
second task, the determination of whether the contractual
provision at issue is ambiguous in the contested respect. Most
jurisdictions, he reports, consider this to be the domain of the
"plain meaning rule." 25 In Burton's view, however, the purport of
the plain meaning rule is often not clearly appreciated. Properly
understood, the plain meaning rule simply asserts the tautology
that if the agreement is unambiguous, its unambiguous meaning
ought to be enforced. The plain meaning rule itself says nothing on
the critical question of what evidence can be looked at to determine
whether an ambiguity is present. The jurisprudence distinguishes
between two different types of ambiguities. "Intrinsic" or "patent"
ambiguity appears from the very face of the document itself or, as
is often said, "within its four corners." "Extrinsic" or "latent"
ambiguity becomes apparent only when one examines evidence
extrinsic to the writing. The face of the document may appear to be
perfectly unambiguous. Extrinsic evidence may show, however,
that there exists a trade usage or that for some other reason the
parties may have attributed a meaning to the particular provision
that is not apparent from the face of the document itself. Most
24. Ibid., at p. 81.
25. Ibid., at p. 105.
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American courts recognize intrinsic but not extrinsic ambiguities.
On this view, extrinsic evidence is inadmissible for task 2. Some
courts recognize both. Courts that refuse to recognize extrinsic
ambiguities often state that they are applying the "four corners
rule." The four corners rule thus differs from the plain meaning
rule when both are properly understood. It is the four corners rule
that restricts a finding of ambiguity to those which appear on the
face of the document. The plain meaning rule, on the other hand, is
applicable to both intrinsic and extrinsic ambiguities. If the court is
not persuaded that the agreement is either intrinsically or
extrinsically ambiguous, the plain meaning of the agreement will
be enforced.
The four corners rule is severely criticized by academics and by
judges that recognize extrinsic ambiguity. Burton aligns himself
with this criticism. The four corners rule is essentially a literalist
approach. Those who reject the four corners rule and hold that
ambiguity should be determined only after reviewing relevant
extrinsic evidence differ, however, on how much extrinsic evidence
should be considered admissible. An objective theorist would
consider not only the face of the document but the parties'
allegations, arguments, affidavits and proffers of extrinsic evidence
of the objective context of the agreement before deciding whether
or not a provision is ambiguous but would not admit extrinsic
evidence concerning the course of negotiations or party testimony
about their own subjective intentions.26 A subjective theorist
would admit the latter as well.
Burton describes a fourth position that may be taken with
respect to the question of ambiguity. In addition, to the above
three positions - literalist, objectivist and subjectivist - Burton
indicates that there are a number of authorities that take a fourth
view that no finding of ambiguity should be required in order to
introduce extrinsic evidence of various kinds for interpretive
purposes. Although this position is supported by leading contract
scholars and by the Restatement Second of Contracts 27 and the
Uniform Commercial Code,28 Burton is opposed.
This fourth position might be explained, however, on the basis
that, where courts are of the view that all the elements that are
admissible and material with respect to the question of ambiguity
26. Ibid., at p. 114.
27. American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Second, Contracts (St. Paul,
American Law Institute Publishers, 1981). Section 212, as interpreted by Burton,
supra, footnote 4, at pp. 139-140.
28. ucc § 2-202(a), as interpreted by Burton. supra. footnote 4, at pp. 140-143.
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are also admissible and material with respect to its resolution, they
would not need to distinguish between contracts which are
ambiguous in some requisite sense and those that are not. A
requirement of a threshold finding of ambiguity would only be
relevant if such a finding made certain additional extrinsic
materials admissible and relevant to the interpretive task. Thus,
in a jurisdiction that admitted all of Burton's objective elements for
the purposes of task 2 and, as well, for the purposes of task 3, there
would be no need to engage in a preliminary and threshold exercise
of asking whether the agreement is ambiguous. The objectivist
elements will be admitted and considered. If the court concludes on
the basis of such elements that the provision is not ambiguous, the
plain meaning will be enforced. If there are two plausible
meanings, however, the court will attempt to choose one on the
basis of the objectivist elements. Similarly, if a court held that
subjectivist elements were material both to the task of finding
ambiguity and to its resolution, the court would again not find it
necessary to make an explicit finding of ambiguity in order to
render certain materials admissible. In short, the explanation for
some courts not taking a threshold step of identifying ambiguity
may simply be that they consider the same list of elements
admissible and relevant for both tasks 2 and 3.
Against this background, there is, perhaps, a fifth position
ignored by Burton. One might consider that certain objectivist
extrinsic elements are relevant both for the task of finding
ambiguity and the task of resolving it but that certain elements
(presumably those of a highly subjective nature) would be
admissible and relevant only if a threshold finding of ambiguity
has been made. Such a court, when looking at merely objectivist
elements, would find no need to identify an ambiguity as a
threshold test for admitting objectivist elements. An ambiguity
threshold would be articulated only if such a court wished to
examine the subjectivist elements whose very admissibility turns on
a threshold finding of ambiguity. As we shall see, this may indeed
be the position under English and Canadian law. I rather suspect it
may be the approach taken in a number of American jurisdictions,
as well.
In chapter 5, "Resolving Ambiguities," Burton turns to the task
of resolving ambiguity. Burton begins by conceding, reluctantly,
"that the subjective theory dominates the law here."2 9 After
examining the respective roles of judge and jury in resolving
29. Supra, footnote 4, at p. 151.
2011]
146 Canadian Business Law Journal
ambiguities under American law, Burton then proceeds to provide
several interesting illustrations of the use of various elements in
resolving ambiguities in the reported cases. Of particular interest
are his discussions of the subjectivist elements. Burton does not
favour reliance on subjectivist elements. Evidence concerning the
course of negotiations would be subjectivist for Burton. As Burton
concedes, however, resort to such evidence is a "potentially
persuasive way of resolving an ambiguity.""o Thus, for example,
deletions and substitutions of language might be revealing. In an
American case, ' a provision in a separation agreement stipulated
that the husband's obligation to support would terminate upon the
wife's "co-habitation with a person in a situation analogous to
marriage." At issue was whether the term "person" referred to
males only or could include females. In part, on the basis of
testimony to the effect that the husband had deleted the term
"male" and replaced it with "person," together with other evidence
of the parties' understanding of the term, the court concluded that
the term person included both males and females. One party was
unfairly trying to enforce a meaning of the agreement that neither
party initially intended. Such cases are compelling reading for
those who think that a court ought to be able to examine such
extrinsic evidence in order to resolve alleged ambiguities in the
agreement.
Permitting parties to testify as to their own past subjective
intentions or understandings might be considered to be more
controversial than allowing in evidence of the history of
negotiations. Nonetheless, in light of the principal objective of
giving effect to the intentions of the parties when interpreting
agreements, the majority American rule is to admit such evidence
in order to resolve an ambiguity. Burton provides the illustration
of a controversy concerning the liability of a tenant "for all
damages ... intentional or non-intentional" under a lease. 32 Such
language appears literally to impose strict liability on the tenant.
Nonetheless, the court admitted evidence both from the tenant and
from the person who drafted the agreement on behalf of the
landlord to the effect that neither party intended the tenant to be
liable in the absence of negligence. Again, where the evidence of
what the parties subjectively intended is clear, many would agree
that the desirable outcome is to give effect to those intentions.
30. Ibid., at p. 165.
31. Stroud v. Stroud, 641 S.E. 2d 142, 49 Va. App. 359 (2007).
32. Supra, footnote 4. at p. 173.
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The third subjectivist element identified by Burton is the parties'
prior "course of dealing." On this point, Burton does not provide
particularly useful illustrations of cases in which courts hold that a
prior course of dealing indicates what the parties must have
intended by the particular language they used. (His main point is
that such evidence is subjectivist because it is aimed at identifying
what the subjective intentions of the parties are, with respect to the
meaning of the particular language used and would, therefore, be
caught by any rule that precludes the admission of evidence of
subjective intentions.) As intimated above, Burton's distinction
between "prior course of dealing" as subjectivist and "practical
construction" or subsequent "course of performance" as
objectivist is difficult to sustain. In each case, the evidence
relates to objective facts. Nonetheless, it is admitted to establish
what the parties subjectively intended by the language they used in
the agreement.
It is, therefore, of interest that Burton provides some appealing
illustrations of the relevance of "course of performance." For
example, in a case concerning the supply of crushed rock,33 where
the agreement was ambiguous as to which party was required to
engage in the final act of crushing the rock to meet certain
specifications, the parties had cheerfully supplied and accepted
rock in a particular size without objection by the purchaser. The
court held that the agreement should be interpreted in light of that
course of performance to mean that the supplier was satisfactorily
complying with its contractual obligations. In another case, 34 a
tenant who paid the assessed taxes on leased land for seven years
and had also taken proceedings to challenge both the taxes
assessed and the valuation upon which they were based was unable
to successfully argue that the proper interpretation of the lease was
that the tenant was not required to pay such taxes. In my view, at
least, such examples make an appealing case for the admission of
such evidence. Burton also provides interesting illustrations of
courts relying on the circumstances or commercial background of
the agreement, the agreement's purpose(s), trade usages and
customs, and statutes and judicial precedents. These less
controversial elements need not be explored for present purposes.
In the final Chapter 6, "Objective Contextual Interpretation,"
Burton sets forth his own vision of the law of interpretation. In this
33. Robson v. United Pacific Insurance Co., 391 S.W.2d 855 (Mo. 1965).
34. Coliseum Towers Associates v. County of Nassau. 769 N.Y.S.2d 293, 2 A.D.3d 562
(2003).
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discussion, Burton reveals himself as someone with rather
conservative views on the admissibility of elements for the
performance of the three interpretive tasks. Indeed, he might be
said to be something of a contrarian. He considers the prevailing
American approach - which is to admit subjective elements in
order to identify the terms of the contract and in order to resolve
ambiguity - to be unsatisfactory. Moreover, it is his view that
several academic luminaries in the field of contracts scholarship,
whose views are aligned with this approach, are misguided. These
are large targets. The late Arthur Corbin, with whom he disagrees,
Mel Eisenberg and the late Allan Farnsworth are, in the view of
many, myself included, the leading contract scholars of their
respective generations. For Burton, however, they have failed to
appreciate that a middle ground, "Objective Contextual
Interpretation," is preferable to the literalism which he claims is
falsely attributed by such scholars to the late Samuel Williston on
the one hand and subjectivism or, even worse, strong subjectivism,
which these scholars favour, on the other hand.
Burton's preferred view with respect to the elements admissible
for the performance of the three tasks may be briefly stated: For
task 1, he proposes a rather austere version of the parol evidence
rule. To determine whether the parties intended a complete
integration of their agreement, a court could examine merely the
contract document and "intrinsic contextual elements,"15 i.e., the
whole contractual document and the document's evident
purpose(s). Burton would not permit a court to examine the
objective circumstances at the time of contracting, for example, or
any other extrinsic evidence. On this view, the presence or absence
of a merger clause obviously weighs very heavily. Burton suggests
that, notwithstanding the presence of such a clause, a written
document might indicate, on its face, that a true merger is not
intended. Imagine, for example, that the document is marked
"draft." 3 ' As Burton concedes, his favoured approach runs against
the American majority view which is to examine all relevant
evidence in order to determine the presence of a shared subjective
intent to integrate the agreement. Burton defends his harsh version
of the rule principally on the basis of the objective of "security of
transactions"" Commercial agreements, he asserts, are typically
35. Ibid., at p. 196.
36. Ibid., at p. 197.
37. Ibid., at p. 199.
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between large commercial entities and often involve foreign parties
"whose legal traditions are strongly tied to the written
agreement." 38 Further, holding the parties to the appearance of
the agreement as integrated is in the interest of third parties such as
assignees, investors and others who might rely on the appearance
of the written document. Burton has little sympathy for the party
who may not have been aware of or understood the significance of
a merger clause. Parties who do not intend an agreement to be
integrated when it appears to be such ought to "speak up." 39
When Burton turns to task 2, the question of ambiguity, he
makes two central points. First, he is strongly of the view that there
must be a finding of ambiguity before one turns to the task of
resolving it. We will return to this point below. Second,
determining whether or not the meaning of a particular
provision is ambiguous involves a question of interpretation. In
this respect it is unlike task 1, which does not involve interpretation
in this sense. Accordingly, a broader range of materials is required
for task 2 than those admissible when performing task 1. Burton's
preferred rule renders admissible what he characterizes as the
objective context. In deciding whether or not a provision is
ambiguous, a court could examine the whole document and its
evident purpose(s), evidence concerning the objective
circumstances at the time of formation, trade usages and any
practical construction. Burton would exclude from consideration
the three subjective elements, prior course of dealing, course of
negotiations and party testimony concerning subjective intentions.
In deciding whether or not a provision is ambiguous, then, Burton
would have a court consider a broad range of extrinsic evidence,
albeit evidence that he considers to be objective in nature. He flatly
rejects any restriction of the finding of ambiguity to those patent
ambiguities that are intrinsic to the document itself. A rule that
restricts the inquiry to intrinsic ambiguities is essentially literalist in
nature and fails for the reasons previously indicated.
Turning to the third task, Burton similarly proposes that the
courts' deliberations on the question of resolving the ambiguity
that has been revealed in task 2 be restricted to consideration of the
objective elements listed above. He rejects the prevailing view that
once ambiguity is discovered, the court should be able to examine
subjective elements for several reasons. His principal objection is
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., at p. 201.
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that it is very difficult to establish subjective intent as a factual
matter. In his view, parties ought to be able to settle disputes
without lengthy investigations of such matters. If the cost of
restricting the courts' deliberations to the objective context will
occasionally lead to decisions which are inconsistent with the
actual intentions of the parties, Burton asserts that this is simply
the cost of having more easily administrable rules. Moreover,
examination of subjective factors, in his view, is not foolproof and
can lead to similar error for different reasons.
Only a brief sketch of Burton's arguments in support of
objective contractual interpretation and possible replies to them
can be attempted here. A principal concern for Burton, often
alluded to in the text, relates to the role of juries in matters of
contract interpretation. If the interpretation rules admit evidence
of subjective intentions, a dispute concerning the nature of the
parties' subjective intent will go to the fact finder. In America, that
will often be a jury. Jury trials are pervasive in the United States,
even in commercial matters. Burton believes that leaving such
matters to a jury is unwise. Jury verdicts are "notoriously
unpredictable," 4 0 perhaps especially in the context of contractual
interpretation. "Many contracts are long, complicated documents
requiring great sophistication to parse them well." 4 1 In Burton's
view, "subjectivism probably confuses a jury unacceptably." 4 2
Juries are likely to confuse the three tasks. Even law students have
difficulty sorting them out. 4 3 If one restricts the inquiry to
objective elements, however, tasks 2 and 3 can typically be
performed by a judge as a matter of law. From afar, one can have a
good deal of sympathy with Burton's aversion to jury verdicts in
this context. Indeed, it may well be that a similar aversion underlies
the more conservative strains of U.S. judicial thinking on
interpretive issues. From a Canadian perspective, however, this
point has little relevance. In common law Canada, juries have
virtually no role to play in the context of commercial disputes.44
Burton also supports his preferred approach on the basis that
the factors relevant to task 2 ought to be the same as those relevant
to task 3. This argument may be thought, however, to cut both
40. Ibid., at p. 214.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid., at p. 203.
43. Ibid.
44. Ontario Law Reform Commission. Report on the Use ofJudry Trials in Civil Cases
(Toronto. Ministry of the Attorney General. 1996).
[Vol. 52
Review Essays and Book Reviews 151
ways. If, as in many jurisdictions, courts will consider evidence
related to subjective intent in resolving ambiguities, this would be
an argument for permitting a court to look at such evidence in
order to decide whether or not the agreement is truly ambiguous.
Indeed, once it becomes clear that Burton holds that the same
elements should be admissible with respect to both task 2 and task
3, one may ask whether it is necessary to identify an ambiguity as a
threshold question. Nothing turns on a finding of ambiguity in the
sense that no additional evidence becomes available to the court.
Burton argues vigorously, however, that the identifying of an
ambiguity must be considered to be a threshold matter. Again, the
underlying concern relates to the role of juries. If a judge finds, as a
matter of law, that there exists no ambiguity, there is nothing to go
to the jury and that, in Burton's view, is a desirable outcome.
Again, this argument has little relevance to the Canadian scene.
Burton's rejection of subjectivist elements also rests on a
theoretical objection to the position he ascribes to "strong"
subjectivists. A strong subjectivist, for Burton, takes the view that
the conventional meaning of language is simply irrelevant to the
exercise of contractual interpretation. The only relevant meaning,
in a strong subjectivist's view, is that attached by each party to the
particular provision. A party who has an idiosyncratic meaning to
the term can insist on that meaning only if the other party is or
ought to have been aware that the first party had such an
intention. In Burton's view, this is Humpty Dumpty's theory of
meaning in Through the Looking-Glass." A word means what I
choose it to mean, nothing more nothing less. Strong subjectivists
ignore the conventional use of language and, allegedly, would
never enforce an agreement on the basis of a conventional or
objective meaning that neither party subjectively intended. If there
are indeed such people, I would agree with Burton that their views
ought not be followed. English, Canadian and, no doubt,
American courts enforce the objective or conventional meaning
of language in contractual documents routinely. It is surely
possible, however, to take the position, as many courts
apparently do, that in the context of a dispute concerning the
proper interpretation of an agreement, it may occasionally be
45. Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass, reprinted in The Complete Works of
Lewis Carroll (New York, Modern Library, 1947), in Burton, supra, footnote 4,
at p. 207.
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relevant to examine the subjective understandings of the parties to
the agreement.
Finally, Burton claims that his preferred approach has the virtue
of being consistent with the objective theory of contract formation.
Again, I find this point unconvincing. As he asserts,4 6 the objective
theory of contract formation holds that the offeree is entitled to
rely on what appears to be an offer made by the offeror, whether
or not the offeror intends it as such. Similarly, the offeror is
entitled to rely on what appears to be a manifestation of
acceptance by the offeree, whether or not acceptance is
subjectively intended. As I understand the objective theory of
contract formation, however, it is not designed to impose contracts
on two parties, neither of whom intended to enter into an
agreement. Rather, it is designed to protect the interest of an
individual who reasonably relies on an objective manifestation of
the other party's consent.
Moreover, the objective theory of contract formation does not
hold that courts cannot entertain evidence of what the parties
actually thought they were doing in making a determination of this
kind. Indeed, it can be argued that the objective theory of contract
formation is more consistent in these respects with a rule of contract
interpretation that allows courts to look at what the parties thought
that they were agreeing to in order to either give effect to those
intentions, where they concur, or protecting the reasonable reliance
of one party on the other's objective manifestation of agreement to
the meaning of a particular term. Burton is offended by the notion
that one party can be held to an interpretation which that party knew
was intended by the other or, indeed, for some reason ought to have
known was intended by the other party. Though I certainly would
not classify myself as a strong subjectivist who believes that the
conventional meaning of language is irrelevant to contract
interpretation, I am much less offended by that proposition and,
indeed, delighted that many courts take the view that in such a case it
may be appropriate to hold one party to the other's understanding of
what the agreement meant.
In sum, though I do have grave reservations about the relevance
of Burton's ultimate thesis to the Canadian context and, indeed, as
to its persuasiveness in a more general way, it is nonetheless the
case that Burton's challenging analysis constitutes an enormously
valuable contribution to our understanding of contractual
46. Ibid., at p. 201.
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interpretation issues. 1, for one, will view the subject in the future
through the lucid and illuminating analytical framework he has
provided.
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